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Abstract:
The United Methodist Church is on the verge of what is expected 
to be a primarily two-way schism. But the denomination is already rather 
divided between seven main sub-churches: the global regions of Africa, 
Europe, and the Philippines, and the four main ideological factions within 
the United States (American traditionalists, the genuine Methodist middle, 
institutionalist liberals, and liberationist progressives). Each of these sub-
churches has important internal divisions, but also distinct characteristics 
setting them apart. Recognizing the particular features of each is crucial for 
understanding how the coming schism will impact and is being prepared 
for by different United Methodists.
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In 1985, the late sociologist Robert L. Wilson and now-Bishop 
William Willimon, then both of Duke Divinity School, published “The 
Seven Churches of Methodism.” 
Their monograph boldly argued that the United Methodist Church 
in America had developed seven distinct geographically based sub-
cultures, to the point “that the United Methodist Church is not one church, 
but seven” (1985:2): 
·	 The Yankee Church
·	 The Industrial Northeastern Church
·	 The Church South
·	 The Midwest Church
·	 The Southwest Church
·	 The Frontier Church
·	 The Western Church
The differences between these seven “churches” in the UMC were at 
times so stark that Wilson and Willimon wrote that, in the immediate 
context of hopes for growth, “[t]he contrast in expectations between some 
congregations in Texas and in New England are so great that it is hard to 
believe they are in the same denomination” (1985:14).
There are obviously limitations in making generalizations about 
such broad groups of people. Nevertheless, it was a valuable, widely 
cited study. Much of it remains helpful for understanding trends that have 
continued across the subsequent three-and-a-half decades. 
With the January 2020 announcement of the “Protocol on Grace 
and Reconciliation through Separation” proposal (hereafter, “the Protocol”) 
and now widely expressed support for it, the UMC is on the verge of a 
widely anticipated formal schism, which many expect to primarily result 
in two main denominations emerging, one more theologically conservative 
and one more theologically liberal. However, even before such a split is 
formalized, I contend that the denomination is already very divided, into 
more than two key factions. In this paper, I show that while the number 
of sub-churches is still seven, the most consequential lines of division 
have become very different from those highlighted in 1985. As in Wilson 
and Willimon’s study, there are extreme differences in the sizes of these 
“churches” and important diversities and sub-divisions within each. This 
paper will identify the particular characteristics of these seven main 
factions within the denomination facing imminent schism. It is crucial to 
understand the distinct realities of the UMC’s seven “churches” today in 
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order to comprehend different ways in which the coming separation will 
ultimately impact and is being approached by different United Methodists.
Geographic differences remain important, especially outside of 
the United States. While each “central conference region”—as the UMC’s 
governing Book of Discipline calls the central conferences of Africa, Europe, 
and the Philippines (¶1311.6, Cf. ¶1704.2)—includes major ideological 
and other divisions, addressed below, United Methodists in these three sub-
churches have largely stayed relatively more unified across at least their 
theological differences. And the realities of international cultural, political, 
and economic variations are such that two United Methodists in Germany 
of different theological perspectives are likely to share many commonalities 
that they do not share with too many Filipino or Congolese members. 
For the United States, whose divisions have primarily driven us 
to this point of impending “grace through separation,” it now makes more 
sense to identify the four sub-churches that have distinguished themselves 
along theological rather than regional lines: traditionalists, the genuine 
“Methodist middle,” institutionalist liberals, and liberationist progressives. 
Today, congregations in different parts of America who share an affiliation 
with either the progressive, LGBTQ-affirming Reconciling Ministries 
Network (RMN) or the evangelical Wesleyan Covenant Association (WCA) 
are likely to feel a greater sense of spiritual connection with each other than 
either is with any nearby United Methodist congregation perceived to be 
“on the other side.” 
While I readily admit my place among American theological 
traditionalists, I have sought to be fair and accurate in this analysis. 
Before individually discussing each of the seven “churches,” I will 
outline some major, big-picture trends influencing all of them. 
Two of the most powerful factors that have long shaped the UMC 
are decades of unabated U.S. membership decline and the dominance 
of the denomination-wide bureaucracy—the Council of Bishops, general 
agencies, and U.S. seminaries—by people whose effective theologies and 
ecclesiologies reflect American liberal Protestantism. 
The first factor has greatly hurt morale within American United 
Methodism, to the point that decline is often accepted as normal. Although 
regional differences remain, the downward trend has spread across the 
country. As a result, the pessimism which Wilson and Willimon observed 
in certain U.S. regions has now become more dominant throughout 
American United Methodism, while the optimism they observed in 
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other regions has become confined to smaller sub-regions, exceptional 
congregations, and a few visionary leaders. In 2017, Willimon recalled 
how after his retirement as an active bishop, a church consultant evaluated 
a Southeastern congregation, and concluded that none of its Duke-trained 
pastoral staff had the skill sets to grow the church, adding “Worse, every 
one of those clergy has a theology for why that’s OK!” (2017). Since 1984, 
all five U.S. Jurisdictions have shrunk significantly, with the Northeastern 
Jurisdiction losing over one-third of its clergy and laity, and the North 
Central and Western Jurisdictions each losing over 40 percent (GCFA 1984; 
Commission 2018). 
Liberal dominance of the denominational hierarchy has remained 
secure overall, despite some exceptions. In 1985, Wilson and Willimon 
observed that Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary had “been a leader 
in Christian social action” and “became deeply involved in the radicalism” 
of the 1960s, resulting in “a credibility gap between the school and its 
traditional constituency who felt that emphasis was not being placed on 
training persons to serve as pastors” (1985:13). Today, a similar, widespread 
credibility gap exists related to the left-of-center social action causes and 
“prophetic” models of ministry often promoted at the denomination’s 
American seminaries, not just Garrett. 
While these factors are based in the United States, they have 
global ripple effects when dwindling American congregations have less 
money to spare for missions, American denominational officials arranging 
partnerships supporting central-conference ministries have their biases, and 
elite central-conference leaders come to America for seminary. 
These factors have helped fuel one of the most dramatic changes 
since 1985: the shift of membership (and to a more limited extent, power) 
from America to elsewhere. Less than seven percent of delegates to the 
General Conference held the year before Wilson and Willimon’s study came 
from outside the United States, which helps explain their exclusive focus on 
America (Journal 1984:24-85). That same year, the data available reported 
less than half a million central-conference United Methodists, accounting 
for less than five percent of the global total of 9.7 million (GCFA 1984). By 
2019, the United Methodist News Service reported that U.S. representation 
at the next General Conference will be down to 55.9 percent, that with 
less than 6.7 million reported members, Americans’ “majority status 
in The United Methodist Church is coming to an end,” and, that due to 
incomplete records and lag times, we may have already passed that tipping 
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point (Hahn 2019). Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for most of the growth in 
central-conference delegates, skyrocketing from a token 22 delegates in 
1984 to 278 now (nearly one-third of the total), although all three central 
conference regions now send significantly more delegates (GCFA 1984; 
Commission 2018). 
These shifts have sparked tensions. Non-Americans have become 
increasingly vocal in seeking a greater say in denominational leadership 
and resource allocation, and in protesting being treated as children or 
pawns. Yet besides General Conference, the membership shifts have not 
been reflected in much of the denominational bureaucracy. For example, 
for the denomination’s global social-justice agency, the General Board of 
Church and Society (GBCS), less than four percent of its board of directors 
are from Africa, fewer than those from the U.S. Western Jurisdiction, 
despite the former being home to roughly half of all United Methodists and 
including several times more people than the latter (GBCS n.d.). Liberal 
Americans frustrated with most central-conference delegates’ theological 
conservatism have sometimes responded by scrutinizing various American 
subsidies for United Methodism overseas.   
Wilson and Willimon predicted growing conflict over how Southern 
Americans would want a greater say in denominational expenditures, 
while, for the Northern Americans who then disproportionately dominated 
the general-agency structure, “Those who became accustomed to making 
such decisions will not relinquish their power willingly” (1985:20). Now 
that General Conference votes have shifted overseas, those Americans 
who were long accustomed to running the denomination have resisted 
sharing, let alone relinquishing, their power. It is no coincidence that 
many institutionalist liberal Americans (Church #3) abandoned previous 
opposition to schism only after the 2019 General Conference showed they 
were no longer as dominant as they had thought. 
In the following pages, I will outline the distinctive features 
and boundaries of each of the UMC’s seven main sub-churches today. 
Importantly, for each of these “churches,” the constituency is far broader 
than those who strongly support or feel represented by their faction’s 
identifiable leaders. 
Church #1: American Traditionalists
Since the release of the Traditional Plan eventually approved by 
the 2019 General Conference (to maintain and ensure enforcement of 
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previously enacted bans on “self-avowed practicing homosexual” clergy 
and “ceremonies that celebrate homosexual unions”), “traditionalist” has 
become a widely accepted label for those whose theology has been called 
orthodox, conservative, and/or evangelical. 
The Good News caucus emerged in 1967 to provide leadership 
for this sub-church, long after Harold Paul Sloan’s “essentialist” movement 
ended. In later years, Good News was joined by such newer caucuses 
as the Institute on Religion and Democracy and its UMAction program, 
Lifewatch, the Confessing Movement, and the WCA.
In late 1987, in a key milestone in the emergence of the Confessing 
Movement, several traditionalist United Methodist clergy developed the 
Houston Declaration. That manifesto defended “three crucial truths which 
are essential to the life, witness and scriptural integrity of the church”:
·	 “the primacy of scripture” as what the Confession of Faith of 
the Evangelical United Brethren Church calls “the true rule and 
guide for faith and practice”;
·	 Traditional Trinitarian doctrine, along with “deplor[ing]” the 
practice of “abandoning the name of God, Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit or adopting inadequate substitutes”; and
·	 Maintaining biblical disapproval of homosexual practice, 
including by treating this behavior as unacceptable for clergy, 
while also “repudiate[ing] all irrational fear of and contempt for 
homosexual persons” (“Houston Declaration” 1987).
The second issue has faded as a prominent controversy. But the 
first and third remain valuable summaries for what unites this faction. Most 
American traditionalists want others to understand that they love members 
of the LGBTQ community and do not see their own sexuality stance as a 
primary value, but rather as derivative of more central commitments like 
scriptural authority. 
This group has long included exceptions to American United 
Methodist pessimism about future growth possibilities. Pastors of many 
of the largest American United Methodist congregations are firmly in this 
camp. For the last several years, Dr. Len Wilson has examined American 
United Methodist congregations with average worship attendances of at 
least 1,000 and developed annual lists of the top 25 with the fastest growth 
in attendance. Analyses of his lists have found a consistent pattern of a 
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strong majority having theologically conservative senior pastors (Moran 
2019).  
This group has most acutely felt the aforementioned “credibility 
gap” between church and seminary. While not an official UMC school, 
Asbury Theological Seminary, with its commitments to evangelical 
Wesleyanism and biblical inerrancy, has been an attractive alternative for 
many traditionalist American seminarians, and has in recent years trained 
many more United Methodist pastors than several of the denomination’s 
own official, heavily subsidized seminaries. Its graduates are consistently 
over-represented among the senior pastors of the fastest-growing large 
congregations (Moran 2019). United Theological Seminary has in recent 
years embraced Nicene orthodoxy and charismatic renewal, making it 
rather exceptional among the UMC’s official American seminaries. 
This faction shares with other American sub-churches some 
anxiety over the decline of culturally encouraged church attendance. But 
while Churches #3 and 4 below respond by urging the UMC to follow 
the leftward trajectory of other “mainline” Protestant denominations 
on sexuality morality and other matters, those in this “church” have 
instead sometimes looked enviously at the greater numerical successes 
and perceived faithfulness in more evangelical, non-mainline American 
churches.  
In early 2019, United Methodist Communications (UMCom) 
released a national survey of American United Methodist laity, finding 
a plurality of 44 percent describing their theology as “Conservative-
Traditional,” compared to the 28, 20, and eight percent who instead chose, 
respectively, “Moderate-Centrist,” “Progressive-Liberal,” and “Unsure.” 
Chuck Niedringhaus, UMCom’s research director, warned against “add[ing] 
the moderates and progressives and say[ing] that’s where the church is,” 
because “[t]heologically, many (moderates) are more traditional” (Hodges 
2019). 
While the value of such undefined, self-chosen labels is limited, 
the survey found key beliefs that set apart “conservative-traditional” 
respondents. Most believe that “the only way to salvation is through a 
relationship with Jesus” (86 percent), “believe in a literal hell” (82 percent), 
and want the UMC’s primary focus to be “saving souls for Jesus Christ” 
rather than “advocating for social justice to transform this world” (88 
percent), while both progressive-liberals and moderate-centrists were much 
more divided on these questions (UMCom 2019).
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Yet this “church” is not nearly as monolithic as sometimes 
imagined. Rev. Dr. William Abraham wisely observed over two decades 
ago, “The conservative wing of the church is itself a fragile coalition, 
including those who lean in a catholic direction, those who are card-
carrying charismatics, those inclined in an Anabaptist direction, and those 
who are really pragmatists at heart but for the moment lean to conservatism 
out of convenience and traditional piety” (1988). Today, the unity of this 
coalition may be somewhat less fragile, in part due to shared negative 
experiences with unfriendly denominational officials and growing societal 
hostility. And yet intra-traditionalist divisions remain, on the points listed by 
Abraham as well as on such matters as ecclesiology and a number of social 
concerns beyond sexual morality. It is worth emphasizing that this “church” 
includes much greater diversity of opinions on American politics than many 
outsiders assume. 
Church #2: The Genuine Methodist Middle of America
This is perhaps the least understood “church.” After all, it is the 
only one with no organized caucus or clear, representative leadership. This 
group has become rather unrepresented among key denominational movers 
and shakers, as a result of the generally more polarized culture within 
the UMC and how elections of delegates to General and jurisdictional 
conferences have been increasingly dominated by “slate voting” (the 
practice of annual conference members, depending on their preferences, 
voting only for candidates on lists disseminated by conservative or liberal 
caucuses).  
But there are many American United Methodists whose theological 
views are truly somewhere in the middle of the denomination’s divides. 
They feel uncomfortable with the packaged-deal stances of the caucuses of 
the other U.S. sub-churches. 
The details of what puts individuals in this sub-church vary widely. 
Some Methodist middlers may sometimes strongly agree with conservative 
caucuses and with liberal caucuses at other times, all on issues important to 
them.  Sometimes it is a matter of taking a position of genuine compromise 
on key issues. One delegate once expressed to me support for the UMC 
becoming more permissive on homosexuality, but also talked of feeling 
“not yet ready” to go as far as changing the church’s definition of marriage. 
Some in the other American “churches” may deem such middling 
stances as unsettled or inconsistent. But that does not erase the fact that 
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the views of significant numbers of United Methodists do not fit neatly into 
any of the other factions. Even if being in this “church” often seems to be a 
transitional phase before people make up their minds to “join” one of the 
other factions, such personal evolutions can stretch over years. 
At the local level, particularly among laity, the majority of members 
have not paid too close attention to General Conferences, caucuses, or 
others beyond their local congregation. The denomination’s growing 
polarization may make such aloofness more difficult. But the majority of 
American congregations also include mixes of perspectives, with members 
previously not feeling too much pressure to “pick a side.” 
When annual conferences and congregations eventually choose 
to align with either a more liberal or a more traditionalist denomination, it 
will be especially difficult for this group. 
It is also important to understand that this group is very different, 
and significantly less liberal, than the caucuses and leaders now prominently 
embracing the “centrist” label. 
Church #3: Institutionalist Liberals
This American sub-church is defined by (1) a strong desire to 
liberalize church standards on sexual morality, (2) key theological shifts 
needed to support this stance, and (3) loyalty to the institutional trappings 
of the United Methodist Church as we have known it—the name branding, 
hierarchies of leadership, and complex structure from our long history of 
“organizing to beat the devil.” 
In their own self-understanding, members of this “church” 
resonate with all of the new UMC Next caucus’s “Four Commitments”:
·	 Claiming continuity with the Wesleyan tradition, including 
familiar United Methodist language referencing the four sides of 
what others have called the Wesleyan quadrilateral and combining 
“personal piety and social holiness”;
·	 Affirming people of all sexual orientations and gender identities 
as part of a larger framework of “resist[ing] evil, injustice and 
oppression” and including people of all races, classes, abilities, 
etc.;
·	 Not only rejecting the 2019 Traditional Plan, but also “resist[ing] 
its implementation”; and
·	 Eliminating in church law teaching and standards expressing 
disapproval of homosexual practice (UMC Next n.d.).
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The first commitment’s unelaborated use of the “social holiness” 
buzz phrase, along with the second commitment, appear indicative of how 
members of this “church,” like much UMC discourse in recent history, 
has understood such values largely in terms of the left-of-center political 
activism associated with organizations like the Methodist Federation for 
Social Action. The repeated mentions of LGBTQ liberation, along with 
careful observation of other statements from this sub-church’s leaders, 
indicate that they see stopping the harm they view as inflicted on LGBTQ 
persons as central to their theological understanding of the church’s mission, 
in contrast to how American traditionalists tend to see sexuality standards 
as derivative of more foundational values. The second commitment’s 
language about staying in the UMC and fighting traditional standards from 
within importantly sets this group apart from both Church #4’s willingness 
to abandon the UMC to start a purely progressive denomination and from 
those in the Church #2 whose own sexuality views are more liberal but do 
not think it is worth fighting a pitched battle after General Conference has 
made its decision. 
Leadership is provided by the majority of American bishops, 
denominational agency officials, leaders from older liberal-caucus 
circles, and all of the newer caucuses describing themselves as “centrist.” 
Sometimes those touting the “centrist” label and their close partners calling 
themselves progressive have been characterized as different factions. But it 
now seems more accurate to understand both as “institutionalist liberals.” 
The self-described “centrist” caucuses, and some of their key leaders, can 
be seen as relative newcomers now strengthening and assuming some 
leadership of a liberal movement with a longer history. Several of these 
newcomers are pastors of large congregations (some with impressive 
growth records) and/or were formerly known as more traditionalist in their 
theology before shifting. Some have track records of supporting key efforts 
to reduce or reform much of the denominational bureaucracy, at times even 
allying with American traditionalists in promoting greater representation for 
regions with more members. 
Given the confusion it has caused, it is probably best to retire use 
of the word “centrist.” On the key dividing controversy over homosexuality, 
every major caucus and leader touting this label has been adamantly one-
sided in pushing for liberalizing church standards as a central priority. 
Furthermore, easily the most prominent “centrist” leader is megachurch 
pastor Adam Hamilton. He has publicly agreed that “[t]he real issue for the 
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church is not homosexuality, but the Bible” and framed his liberal position 
on homosexuality as undergirded by viewing different parts of scripture 
as divided into three buckets: those “that express God’s heart, character 
and timeless will,” those that expressed God’s will only for a limited time, 
and those “that never reflected God’s heart and will” (Hamilton 2014). 
This “centrist” view of scripture is not terribly distinguishable from those 
expressed within older liberal-caucus circles. 
A brief historical review is warranted. The term “centrist” was not 
widely used in denominational discourse until after an organization called 
the “United Methodist Centrist Movement” was launched in West Ohio in 
late 2014. That caucus initially named several concerns, but received more 
attention in 2015 as it moved towards its apparent main goal of electing 
fewer traditionalist General and Jurisdictional Conference delegates. 
Evangelicals in the conference observed that this caucus eventually included 
as key figures some who had previously been known as unambiguously 
liberal, but then seemed to find the “centrist” label to be more marketable. 
In 2017, leaders from this organization, Hamilton, and others launched a 
nationwide “centrist” caucus called Uniting Methodists, primarily focused 
on promoting liberalized church standards on homosexuality. At that time, 
I carefully examined every founding leadership team member of this newer 
organization for stances taken on other prominent controversies (abortion, 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the denomination’s social witness more generally, 
the propriety of clergy violating the Discipline, and core doctrine on 
matters like Christology). On each issue, I found some leaders with records 
of strongly advocating a liberal stance, others who reputedly had more 
conservative views but who had declined to help conservative efforts at 
recent points of great denominational conflict over the issue, and not much 
else (Lomperis 2017). Since then, I have observed that this basic analysis 
remains true of every caucus and most leaders touting the “centrist” label. 
Tellingly, in the mediation team that developed the Protocol, the two 
initially selected to represent “the centrists” and the two initially selected 
to represent supposedly distinct “progressives” were all members of the 
Convening Team of Hamilton’s UMC Next caucus, including the current and 
a former CEO of RMN, with a common legislative agenda (Reconciliation…
Team, “FAQ’S” 2020; UMC Next n.d.).
Leaders and activists of both this “church” and Church #1 have 
often defined themselves in opposition to each other. They sometimes 
emphasize that they are “not that kind of United Methodist.” American 
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traditionalists have often understood their place as in large part defined by 
rejecting what they see as the theological unorthodoxy, idolatrous loyalty 
to the denominational bureaucracy, and, to a lesser extent, social liberalism 
of institutionalist liberals. Institutionalist liberals have often understood 
their place in large part as rising above what they see as the narrow 
theological “fundamentalism,” destructive and disloyal undermining of key 
denominational leadership structures, and retrograde opposition to social 
justice among American traditionalists. Leaders of each have often claimed 
that the denomination could become much more effective if only the other 
faction would stop holding us back. 
But just as William Abraham observed internal differences among 
American traditionalists being held in check by the greater struggle within 
the UMC, similar observations could be made about this sub-church. They 
have done a remarkable job in recent years of maintaining a united front 
against the traditionalists. But will such unity hold after the separation? 
Time will tell. 
Church #4: Liberationist Progressives
The self-described “liberationist” faction in America is sometimes 
given disproportionate attention. It merits listing as its own sub-church 
primarily due to speculations of some of its members forming a third 
denomination. This possibility is explicitly provided for in the Protocol. 
Until recently, leadership for this faction had been mainly provided 
by the UM-Forward caucus, whose own plan (submitted before the 
Protocol proposal was unveiled) would dissolve the UMC into four new 
denominations: one for themselves, one for self-described progressives 
who UM-Forward finds insufficiently progressive, one for moderates, and 
one for traditionalists. They summarize their own potential denomination’s 
identity as “grounded in Gospel-centered, anti-colonial, and intersectional 
justice that intentionally empowers PoC+Q+T [people of color + queer + 
trans] people” (UM-Forward n.d.).
Activists in this sub-church have made clear that even limited, 
temporary toleration for clergy who decline to conduct same-sex weddings 
is unacceptable. They have sometimes decried as a betrayal institutionalist 
liberals’ push for the One Church Plan (OCP), which would have liberalized 
church standards on homosexuality, with some protections to allow 
conferences, congregations, and clergy to continue with a traditionalist 
approach. (It is worth noting that traditionalist leaders critiqued these 
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protections as insufficient, unsustainable facades, and that leading OCP 
proponents abandoned support for even such limited protections after 
the plan’s defeat at the 2019 General Conference.) Some in this “church” 
have accused institutionalist liberals of prioritizing loyalty to and the desire 
to maintain control of the denominational establishment over LGBTQ 
liberation. 
A May 2019 UM-Forward gathering produced a lengthy, multi-part 
“Loved and Liberated” manifesto outlining their vision for the denomination 
they want. Some noteworthy highlights include commitments to:
·	 “reject gradualism and incrementalism” and accept “no 
concession of any kind” to opponents of LGBTQ liberation;
·	 prioritize “the fullness of the Gospel and liberative change” over 
“denominational preservation”;
·	 “create an expression of Methodism that is Christ-full and centers 
PoC+Q+T voices and their lived experiences”;
·	 “actively resist white supremacy, heterosexism, sexism, patriarchy, 
transphobia, xenophobia, ableism, colonialism, classism, and 
establishmentism”;
·	 “dismantle[e] hierarchical structures”; and
·	 have doctrinal standards that better “embody a theology of 
liberation” (“Loved and Liberated” 2019).
With UM-Forward’s repeated allusions to a range of left-wing 
social causes, seen as intertwined parts of an “intersectional” whole, this 
“church” is probably the most politically monolithic. 
It includes some General Conference delegates and prominent 
activists. But it lacks the resources, prominent leadership, and naturally 
aligned institutions of the first and third sub-churches. A review of the 100 
largest-membership congregations in American United Methodism found 
only one, The Gathering in St. Louis, formally affiliated with RMN (GCFA 
2018; RMN n.d.). 
Another problem for this “church” is that many of the grassroots 
members whose values best fit into this group are among the biggest “flight 
risks,” who may scatter away before any acceptably liberal Methodist 
denomination is truly organized. A 2020 poll of clergy, lay leaders, and 
voting lay members of the Indiana Annual Conference, the largest in the 
North Central Jurisdiction, found 43.7 percent taking a liberal position on 
“human sexuality,” and 27.9 percent saying they are not likely to remain in 
the denomination if its position does not change (Lomperis 2020). While 
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the latter figure indicates a potentially wider constituency for this faction, 
it remains unclear how many will ever connect to UM-Forward or related 
organizations. 
A March 2020 UM-Forward conference was officially dedicated 
to “Trailblazing the Liberation Methodist Church” but also was divided 
between those eager to start a new denomination and those still hoping to 
bring the greater UMC around to their vision (Hodges 2020). In late 2020, 
this divide became formalized with two new associations emerging from 
the UM-Forward caucus.  The new “Liberation Project” is clearly devoted 
to trying to win over a larger portion of the denomination to its liberationist 
progressive values, in marked contrast to seeking to split off and start a 
new liberationist denomination (Hahn, “Group” 2020). The Liberation 
Methodist Connexion or “LMX,” on the other hand, describes itself as a 
new “grassroots denomination of former, current, and non-Methodist faith 
leaders working on the unfolding of the kin-dom of God” [sic], in which 
they “intentionally invite the full participation of all who are living out 
their God-given identities and expressions” in diversities such as “gender 
expressions and sexual identity,” “religious or non-religious backgrounds,” 
“heritage/nationality/citizenship/immigration status,” “monogamous and 
non-monogamous,” and “use of drugs,” among other things (2020).  
Despite this official dichotomy, it is unclear if the latter wing of 
liberationist progressives will actually draw any significant numbers out into 
a new denomination. I have not seen confirmation of a single congregation, 
minister, or layperson actually joining the LMX, let alone the 100 
congregations that the Protocol sets as the minimum size for any departing 
faction to form its own denomination and have such rights as keeping its 
church properties (Reconciliation…Team, “Protocol Legislation” 2020). 
The organizers of this supposed “denomination” have pointedly refused 
to say how many members or local churches they have, conveniently 
telling the United Methodist News Service that “they do not want to equate 
worth with volume,” and have even hedged their bets by talking about 
continuing to work with like-minded United Methodists and “not asking 
people to choose between” the UMC or the LMX (Hahn, “New” 2020). But 
the UMC’s church law clearly forbids simultaneous membership in another 
denomination, so that “[u]pon joining another denomination, membership 
in The United Methodist Church is terminated,” which further limits the 
LMX’s potential to realize its professed goals (UMC Judicial Council 1993).
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Furthermore, there are several more principled reasons that could 
doom this faction’s ability to launch and maintain their own denomination. 
If the Protocol passes and liberationists finally found themselves in an 
increasingly liberal denomination that allowed same-sex unions and saw 
numerous traditionalists part ways, the very goals for which they have 
sought so hard for decades, how many would really take the trouble to 
leave to start over? How sustainable will it be for the LMX’s leaders to 
continue explicitly declaring that they have no doctrinal litmus tests 
while at the same time being rather doctrinaire about certain core values 
they see as non-negotiable social-justice causes?  Given how this faction 
is disproportionately led by LGBTQ activists and focused on LGBTQ 
concerns, is the realistic ceiling of the LMX’s potential to become a niche 
denomination primarily focused on an LGBTQ constituency? How would 
it craft an identity clear enough to justify a separate existence from other 
liberal denominations?
But then again, if the next General Conference fails to liberalize 
sexuality standards or enact a separation agreement, then we could see 
some current institutionalist liberals get frustrated enough to prepare to 
leave to form their own denomination, thus having more in common with 
the liberationists, rather than continuing to stay and fight. Especially in the 
Western Jurisdiction, the aftermath of the 2019 General Conference saw 
early signs of some now in the institutionalist liberal camp preparing to leave, 
with a more liberationist progressive mindset, before the announcement of 
the Protocol proposal. 
Church #5: Sub-Saharan Africa
African United Methodism dates back to freed American slaves 
settling in Liberia in the early 1800s (UMCom, “History…Africa,” n.d.). 
Now this region has over 6.2 million members—a nearly 20-fold increase 
from 1984—spread across 31 nations and three central conferences (GCFA 
2017). 
Making generalizations about such a large group can be 
dangerous. Yet several broad outlines can be observed. United Methodists 
are a major part of the religious landscape in parts of Africa, like Sierra 
Leone, where they have been the largest Protestant denomination (Snider 
2016). This sub-church tends to fervently cherish its United Methodist 
identity and the cross-and-flame logo, in contrast to how some American 
congregations minimize denominational branding. 
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This region is severely under-represented in denominational 
leadership. Yet it is the only one of the seven “churches” with strong, 
consistent growth in this era. This has helped fuel optimistic expectations 
for the church. In recent years, African leaders have become increasingly 
vocal in seeking to set the denomination’s direction on sexuality, funding 
priorities, and other issues, with much leadership provided by the Africa 
Initiative, a newer caucus of African General Conference delegates. 
African United Methodists are overwhelmingly theologically 
traditionalist, with a high view of scripture, strong commitment to 
evangelism, and near-unanimity in disapproving of homosexual practice 
(often in much stronger terms than American traditionalists use). One 
institutionalist liberal caucus admitted that “almost no” African delegates 
voted for proposals to liberalize sexuality standards in 2019 (Holland 2019). 
But American traditionalists should avoid taking an ultimately 
dehumanizing, idealized view of African United Methodists. Such 
“romantic racism” has an ignoble history. And disapproval of homosexuality 
is a cultural default in most of Africa. In the majority of African nations 
with a UMC presence, homosexual intercourse is outlawed in some way 
(Mendos 2019:47-50, 139). Not all who accept their culture’s disapproval 
of homosexuality are necessarily strong in upholding more contextually 
counter-cultural or personally costly aspects of biblical morality. Similar 
things could be said, to varying degrees, about United Methodists in some 
other central-conference regions. 
There are also some exceptions, which should be neither 
ignored nor exaggerated. A few African General Conference delegates 
have supported liberalizing proposals on homosexuality. U.S.-based 
denominational officials have sometimes helped prop up unrepresentative 
African leaders who are more amenable to liberal Western theology. 
Furthermore, as the denomination approaches schism, one prominent 
African leader has reported that “some influential African bishops, who 
are in support or sympathetic to this progressive sexual ethic,” are seeking 
to bring African United Methodism into the denomination that will allow 
same-sex unions, at least in the United States (Matonga 2020). Sometimes 
this appears to be driven less by principled support for gay rights than by 
an institutionalist mindset of wanting to preserve connections with the 
denomination’s branding and connectional structures, and judging that 
this is worth remaining yoked with an American church with liberalized 
sexuality policies, as long as those policies are not imposed in Africa. 
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United Methodists here face vastly different social contexts, 
internally and compared to other regions. African members have had the 
most experience with interfaith relationships and conflict. Many have 
lived through violent civil unrest. The infrastructure insufficiencies and 
government corruption in some places can be difficult for Americans 
to appreciate. Tribalism is often a powerful feature in social life, and 
sometimes has been tied to painful, dramatic divisions in the contexts of 
bishop elections and annual conference attempts to maintain a cohesive 
identity.  
Poverty is a major challenge. In 2019, the gross national income 
per capita for Sub-Saharan African nations with a major UMC presence 
ranged from oil-rich Angola at the highest with $3,050 to Burundi at a mere 
$280 (ranking last among 192 nations). For comparison, America’s 2019 
gross national per capita income was $65,760 (World Bank 2020). 
Such disparities have fostered extreme and likely unsustainable 
levels of dependency on American subsidies. One striking example was 
the late Bishop John Yambasu of Sierra Leone estimating in 2017 that 95 
percent of the salaries of his conference’s full-time pastors and evangelists 
came from abroad, primarily from United Methodists in Germany and 
central Pennsylvania (Jusu 2017). 
For decisions about denominational standards and affiliations, 
several African leaders have strongly declared the determination of 
themselves and most other African United Methodists to never sacrifice 
their traditionalist doctrinal values for the sake of American dollars. Yet 
some other African leaders appear to be influenced by perceptions (for 
which others have challenged the data) that the more liberal denomination 
would have more money available to continue subsidizing Africa. 
Another key characteristic is that African United Methodists are 
generally accustomed to “big man” models of leadership, and the culture is 
often more “rule of man” rather than “rule of law.” Thus, African conferences 
tend to see more power and effective decision-making concentrated in 
the episcopal office, with fewer checks and balances, than Americans of 
any perspective would accept from their bishops. Relatedly, while central 
conferences have a limited right to produce substantially adapted versions 
of the Book of Discipline for use in their own contexts, this right does not 
appear to have been exercised as widely and recently in Africa as in Europe. 
Some of this can be attributed to prohibitive costs. But it also may reflect 
a lack of felt need to publish permanent laws which could tie leaders’ 
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hands, when leaders are accustomed to simply deciding what is best, with 
a broader range of discretion than in Western cultures.  
Church #6: The Philippines
The Philippines Central Conference is much smaller, with three 
active bishops and slightly more than 200,000 members (GCFA 2017). 
While this is nearly a tripling in size since 1984, more recently membership 
has faced stagnation (Commission 2018; GCFA 1984). It faces some similar 
economic challenges as Sub-Saharan Africa, albeit to a lesser degree. 
The overwhelming majority of the nation is Roman Catholic. Within the 
Protestant minority, United Methodist congregations often struggle to retain 
their younger people and do not reach the sizes of some of what are called 
“the born-again churches” in their communities.  
Yet much of this sub-church is rather mission-minded. In recent 
years, Filipino United Methodists have planted congregations among 
overseas Filipino worker (OFW) communities in other nations, including 
the Islamic Middle East. One key leader of these efforts likes to emphasize 
that they have done all of this “without asking for or receiving one dime of 
American money.” 
The denomination’s presence here began in 1899, right after the 
Spanish-American War. Desire to not feel dominated by the United States 
(the islands’ former colonial rulers) have fueled periodic movements for 
autonomy. But the majority keeps remaining United Methodist (UMCom, 
“History…Asia,” n.d.; Oconer and Asedillo 2011:269-277). In 2011, a 
contested allegation against Bishop Lito Tangonan escalated to the point of 
the bishop leaving to start his own denomination, with fights over church 
properties spilling into lawsuits and even physical violence (Scott 2019). 
By 2013, Bishop Tangonan had gotten over 200 congregations to join his 
Ang Iglesia ng Metodista sa Pilipinas (AIMP) denomination (McLoughlin 
2015:116). This was a significant defection, as the central conference 
reported having just under 1,500 that year (GCFA 2013, n.d.). However, 
some congregations later returned to the UMC.
Having already experienced multiple schisms since 1909 
(UMCom, “History…Asia,” n.d.; Oconer and Asedillo 2011:275-277, 280), 
even within such recent memory, makes talk of schism particularly loaded 
for Filipinos. One denominational official has suggested that whatever 
its immediate causes, the AIMP defection may have had the effects of 
“siphoning off those pastors and churches that were most pro-autonomy 
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and anti-UMC,” dampening of pro-autonomy sentiments among those 
who remained, and making Filipinos leerier of any additional schism (Scott 
2019). 
Theologically, a strong super-majority of Filipino United 
Methodists are traditionalist. This sub-church includes an active charismatic 
renewal movement. However, in contrast to Africa, there is a sizable and 
sometimes vocal theologically liberal minority. One major source of liberal 
influence, on more foundational doctrinal matters than sexuality, is Union 
Theological Seminary not far from Manila. Furthermore, the bishops are 
in a different place than the majority of their people. Only Bishop Pedro 
Torio, based in the northern city of Baguio, has consistently defended a 
theologically traditionalist approach. 
This central conference has a unique system of electing all three of 
its bishops to renewable four-year terms. This has sometimes, though not in 
all cases, encouraged a mindset that a district superintendents’ job includes 
building their bishop’s political machine to help his always-approaching 
re-election. I have been told that one main reason why Filipinos have not 
exercised their right to make adaptations to the Discipline is all the time 
at quadrennial central conference meetings that is sucked up by the three 
bishop elections. 
While the Philippines is allotted 52 delegates to the next General 
Conference, Filipinos have generally not been as assertive as Africans 
or Europeans in seeking to shape General Conference. The hundreds of 
petitions submitted to the next General Conference by the regular deadline 
included only four from Filipino groups or individuals, less than the number 
submitted from people in the Norway Conference, with only three percent 
as many members, (Commission 2018; DCA 2020: Section 1, pages 158, 
163, 221, 222, 247, 325, 339, 371; Section 2, page 816). Of the over one 
thousand petitions submitted to the last regular General Conference, the 
record does not show one submitted from the Philippines (DCA 2016). 
Furthermore, there is a widespread culture here of electing new delegates to 
each General Conference. But the most effective delegates from elsewhere 
are usually “veterans” who have served at several, thus building nuanced 
understanding of the processes and connections with fellow delegates over 
the years. Consequently, Filipino United Methodists do not have as deep 
a bench of experienced, influential leaders who are widely recognized 
beyond the Philippines. 
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Church #7: The Central Conferences of Europe
Continental European Methodist history stretches back to close to 
the beginning of Methodism, as migrants of various European nationalities 
traveled to and from the New World. For leadership allotments, UMC polity 
sometimes treats this region as a single constituency. Leaders from all four 
of its episcopal areas have participated in cooperative efforts. 
But the Discipline’s references to “the central conferences in 
Europe” are not completely accurate. The Central and Southern Europe 
Central Conference stretches into Algeria and Tunisia in North Africa. The 
Moscow-based Eurasia Episcopal Area (one of two episcopal areas within 
the Northern Europe and Eurasia Central Conference) stretches across Asian 
Russia into the central Asian former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. 
And yet despite this long history now reaching across 30 nations, 
today this region only counts slightly over 50,000 members, a number 
which has been trending downward. With the fall of Communism, what is 
now the Northern Europe and Eurasia Central Conference expanded into 
Russia. But in recent years, none of its conferences has seen consistent 
growth. The other two European central conferences have each lost over 
one-third of their people since 1984 (Commission 2018; GCFA 1984; 
GCFA 2009; GCFA 2013; GCFA 2017). 
There are major differences in scale. Over half of members here 
are in the Germany Central Conference. Each of the five annual conferences 
of the Eurasia Episcopal Area has less than five hundred church members 
(GCFA 2017). But their challenges of vast geography and government 
persecution merit sympathy. 
In 1985, Wilson and Willimon noted how United Methodism 
“can feel very much like an isolated, minority movement” in much of the 
U.S. Western Jurisdiction. The same can be said about this sub-church, 
ministering on rocky soil with generally abysmal church attendance rates. 
This has helped United Methodists here to value their identity as connected 
to a larger, global denomination. 
Internal divisions have often been generalized in terms of the 
Western nations having greater wealth as well as theological liberalism, 
and the Eastern nations often facing serious government repression and 
financial dependencies. This is largely true. 
But it is not that simple. In much of Europe, being any kind of 
serious, church-going Christian is already so counter-cultural that it can 
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foster deeper levels of commitment. So, the faith of some (though certainly 
not all) United Methodists in very socially liberal Western European nations 
can be rather theologically orthodox. At the same time, some theological 
traditionalists in Western Europe judge such things as Americans supporting 
Donald Trump or the National Rifle Association about as harshly as 
heterodox doctrinal statements from liberal caucuses. 
In contrast to Africa, each of the European central conferences has 
a very accessibly documented, recent history of exercising its right to make 
regional adaptations of the Discipline, with varying degrees of significance. 
Notably, after the 2019 General Conference adopted the Traditional Plan, 
the Germany Central Conference’s executive committee unanimously 
endorsed a statement decrying this legislation as “not acceptable” and 
declaring that their central conference “will therefore not follow the 
chosen way of controlling people in their disposition and imposing stricter 
penalties” (Ruof 2019). While such defiance might have been legally 
challenged if not for the coming split, this reflects the dominant liberalism 
among German United Methodists, to which there are some exceptions. 
This region, particularly in wealthier Western nations, does not 
have quite the same dependency issues as other central conferences. In 
some countries, the UMC even enjoys government subsidies, along with 
other religious bodies. In 2019, the annual conferences of all four European 
episcopal areas contributed much more than their assigned apportionments 
to support the Episcopal Fund (the global pool from which all bishops are 
funded), and members in Germany and Central and Southern Europe did 
what no other United Methodists outside America did: contribute more than 
enough to cover their own respective bishop’s salaries (GCFA 2019:4; DCA 
2020: Section 1, page 438). United Methodists in richer parts of this region 
have subsidized poorer areas in the region, and also supported missions in 
other parts of the world. 
While civil law in much of Western Europe affirms same-sex 
unions (Mendos 2019:144-146, 153-155), I am told that in at least the non-
German central conferences, Europeans have not had the same experience 
as Americans of liberal clergy publicly defying the denomination’s bans 
on same-sex weddings. Thus, while many of the same theological divides 
in America are present in Europe, United Methodists here have not gone 
through the same level of polarizing controversies, mutual feelings of 
betrayal, and alienation of affections that have been so key in laying the 
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foundations for schism in America. This may make the coming schism all 
the more difficult here when a time comes for “choosing sides.” 
Concluding Considerations
A long-lasting theological civil war in the UMC has finally 
reached a breaking point, so that some form of large-scale separation is 
now inevitable. But while the main formal separation may be binary, some 
major divisions are not. This paper has demonstrated how the denomination 
is already divided into seven distinct major factions, each with important 
differences from the others. Each is approaching and will be impacted by 
the coming separation differently. And given the complexities of internally 
diverse annual conferences having to pick one side, we can expect that 
both of the two main denominations emerging from the split will include 
members from at least several of the constituencies outlined above. The 
success or failure of any denomination emerging from the split will likely 
hinge on its leaders’ willingness and ability to understand such internal 
differences in nuanced ways, clearly establish their denomination’s basis 
and boundaries for unity, and make, in the concluding words of Wilson and 
Willimon (1985:21), “its various parts organized to witness and to minister 
most effectively.” 
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